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Hannaford Data Breach May be 'Tip of the Iceberg'

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Ski Resort Reports Similar Breach; Investigators Eye up to 50 Other Incidents
April 4, 2008 - Linda McGlasson, Managing Editor

This article was originally created for BankInfoSecurity.com, and contains information that should interest our GovInfoSecurity.com readers.
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The recent breach of a Maine-based grocery chain may just be the beginning of a novel and sophisticated attack method. Earlier this week, the Okemo Mountain Resort, a ski resort in Vermont, announced that it had been hacked in a similar manner. (SEE OKEMO ANNOUNCEMENT)

"It does look like the tip of the iceberg," says Nick Holland, a security analyst with the Aite Group, a Boston, MA financial services research firm. Law enforcement officials indicate that they are investigating as many as 50 other similar incidents in the Northeast.

News of the Hannaford Brothers breach broke on March 17 (SEE RELATED STORY: Hannaford Data Breach: The Victims Fight Back), and subsequent investigation revealed that malware was surreptitiously placed on the servers at 300 of the store locations. That malicious software then enabled criminals to capture "track 2" data as it was transmitted from the store to one of the credit card processors. Hannaford President and CEO Ron Hodge says in an apology to customers, "Security experts tell us [it] was a novel and sophisticated attack on our computer network that resulted in the theft of certain credit and debit card numbers."

The company says that the malicious software has been located and removed from company servers.

How Big is Big?
The breach saw 4.2 million credit card numbers taken, and more than 1,800 of those numbers have been reported as having been used. That number, according to law enforcement involved in the breach, is going up.

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Hannaford's senior vice president and general counsel Emily Dickinson detailed the breach and how malicious software was installed on Hannaford's computers in a letter to Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley and the Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation. In the letter Dickinson says Hannaford was certified as meeting Payment Card Industry (PCI) standards in 2007 and also received PCI certification on February 27.

The U.S. Secret Service says the Hannaford breach began as one message sent to a Hannaford store, and it then multiplied and went to other Hannaford locations. The malicious software picked up credit card numbers and expiration dates as they were in transit between the store and the credit card company. It would also send "batches" of the collected numbers to an Internet Service Provider IP address overseas. Hannaford's web site says the "data was illegally accessed from Hannaford's computer systems during the card verification transmission process in transactions."

"This event is highly significant because it represents the first publicly-acknowledged theft of sensitive card authorization data in transit," says Avivah Litan, Vice President and Distinguished Analyst, Gartner Inc.

More card fraud has been discovered as a result of the breach. Law enforcement reports criminals are charging items on the cards in the Southern U.S. and up and down the east coast. Charges have turned up on the exposed cards in Mexico, Bulgaria and Italy.

PCI Compliance Equals Security?
The announcement by Hannaford that it was PCI-compliant is certainly not good PR for PCI, says Aite Group's Holland. He likens PCI compliance to a driver's license. "It means you passed the test, but then aren't scrutinized after when you're driving."

David Taylor, President of the PCI Security Vendors Alliance, points out PCI is not an insurance policy against network breaches.

"A PCI Assessment is a 'point in time' assessment," Taylor says. "Things can change in the network, and elsewhere in the systems and procedures that cause the company to 'fall out of' compliance."

This is why a company cannot expect that a once-a-year assessment protects them (like an insurance policy) for a whole year. The merchant is responsible for monitoring those changes (e.g., a new application, or someone opening up a port in the firewall, or turning off event logging or alerts - all of which happen every week in most organizations) on a nearly continuous basis.

The most important thing merchants can do is "operationalize" compliance says Taylor. Rather than have PCI (or SOX) be "owned" only in IT, Taylor recommends companies "spread the wealth" or "deputize" other people to own pieces of it for their departments. "If data security and privacy are owned by only a few people, the rest of the company becomes complacent, assuming that person will 'watch out for' the rest of the company," Taylor says. "But so many systems and business processes have potential vulnerabilities that 'narrow ownership' simply does not scale effectively."


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Question
?If, indeed, Hannaford was PCI-compliant when it was breached, what message does this incident send to financial institutions about PCI compliance?
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"This breach had nothing to do with a failure of PCI. It had eveything to do with a failure to follow basic practices by their not implementing tight outbound control policies on the firewalls.



What the heck were they doing allowing servers to talk to the entire Internet? Do they sell groceries overseas? If not, don't let your systems go there by default.



Even if the malware got in by a "message", presumably an email attachment, it should not have been able to get out and its attempts to get out would have lit up the firewall logs like a Christmas tree.
"The message sent is that the PCI compliance is deficient in audit and enforcement of best practices for configuration control/technical review of changes to the annual audited baseline.
"As a card issuer, I am concerned that the PCI Compliance Standards are not thorough enough to provide adequate assurance of a merchants card acceptance activities.
"Another example of how compliance does not mean protected. Protection is only as good as the most negligent or ignorant employee. Also further illustrates how information security is not just a technology issue, but is a business issue that senior management should be very engaged in.
"The message is clear; PCI Compliance standards alone cannot be used for best practices to ensure secure customer data. Most retailers do not retain as much customer information as a financial institution or health organization, but I believe they should be held on similar regulatory guidelines to keep the data they do retain secure.
"Isn't there, or if not, should there be a requirement that the data transmitted between the POS terminals and the credit card processor be encrypted? I know the ATM network from ATM machines through the network and to the banks requires encryption. I would have thought the payment card industry would have the same rules.
"It is always a chess game when dealing with security of data. But the question of being PCI DSS Compliant is raised. If one person was infected by this malware and then it multiplied, this raises a few questions dealing with the standard. I would be questioning the firewall configuration (Section 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.3) change management procedures ( Section 6.4), was the data while in transit protected Section 4.1), was the cardholder data systems appropriately segmented to only authorized users (Section 7 & 8), was IPSec employed, were they using appropriate anti-virus software (section 5)? If the PCI DSS is implemented with the appropriate focus, this may have been caught quicker. Again this is a chess game that everyone must be proactive and anticipate as the attacks become more sophisticated, the defenses must be constantly upgraded.
"PCI is a code to do business by. It is a "way of life" for those protectors of consumer data. It is not a high water mark you need to shoot for, hit and be compliant with PCI. The set of PCI requirements are just that... Requirements. We as custodians of customer data need to maintain systems in order to continually meet the requirements of the PCI regulations. PCI just as any requirement in Technology is always and ever changing. Does anybody still use their 80286 PC any longer? No, we upgrade learn and adapt. This is the same mentality that need to go into all aspects of Information Security from hardening servers to building applications that continue to evolve into more secure coding efforts.
"PCI compliance would be a poor resources investment
"I have a lot of doubt about the effectiveness of PCI compliance. I worked for a processor at one time and if they had a unit not going to pass they had them removed from the "list" on the Visa website...clients never noticed the unit missing as much as they noticed if the unit went yellow or red.