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Hannaford Data Breach: The Victims Fight Back

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Customers, Institutions Angry Over Compromised Card Transactions, Fraud
March 24, 2008 - Linda McGlasson, Managing Editor

This article was originally created for BankInfoSecurity.com, and contains information that should interest our GovInfoSecurity.com readers.
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Scores of financial institutions received alerts from Visa and MasterCard this past week in the wake of news from the Maine-based Hannaford Brothers grocery chain that 4.2 million customer card transactions were compromised by hackers.

More than 1,800 of those credit card numbers have already been used for fraudulent transactions. Affected by the breach were all 165 Hannaford stores in New England and New York, 106 Sweetbay stores in Florida and 24 independent stores that carry Hannaford products in the Northeast. Hannaford and Sweetbay are owned by the Belgian supermarket chain Delhaize America.

Within two days of the breach announcement, two class action lawsuits on behalf of customers were filed against the retailer. The suits charge Hannaford was negligent for failing to provide adequate security for computer data.

Although the case is among the largest security breaches on record, it is much smaller than the 45 million credit cards taken earlier from TJX, a Framingham, MA., retail chain with 2,500 stores including T.J. Maxx and Marshalls store chains. (SEE RELATED STORY:)

The Damage
At least 60 to 70 Massachusetts banks have received alerts from Visa and MasterCard about thousands of exposed credit and debit cards caught in a new data breach, says Daniel J. Forte, president and CEO of the Massachusetts Bankers Association (MBA).

"The affected accounts appear to be located in banks in Massachusetts and northern New England," Forte says. The MBA has been in discussions with the card companies, as well as pursuing legislative remedies that would change card company rules and require release of the name of the offending retailer, as well as place liability for the costs associated with a breach with the retailer. The association demanded that the credit card companies name the retailer, and later Hannaford stepped forward and acknowledged the breach (SEE HANNAFORD ANNOUNCEMENT).

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Maine credit unions say 100,000 credit and debit cards are expected to be reissued because of the Hannaford breach.

"Because the compromise occurred at a major Maine retailer that so many Maine people use on a regular basis, the impact and cost of this compromise will be significantly higher than the TJX compromise last year," says Rebekah Higgins, Card Services Manager at Synergent, the service subsidiary of the Maine Credit Union League, which handles card services and processing for many Maine credit unions. She says a number of credit unions have already begun reissuing their entire card base.

Vermont banks and credit unions are also carefully watching their customers' cards for fraud after the Hannaford breach. Heritage Family Credit Union in Rutland, VT posted a message on its Web site, www.hfcuvt.com. The message says it will send letters to its members that have had their cards identified by Visa as part of the breach, as soon as the card numbers are released to the credit union.

A 2007 data security breach law passed in Vermont now requires prompt notification of a data security breach. The law covers non-financial companies. It requires businesses and state agencies to notify consumers in the event of a security breach that compromises the security, confidentiality or integrity of certain personal information maintained by the state agency or business.

What Happened?
While the United States Secret Service and other forensic investigators are still unraveling exactly where and how the card data was taken, there are some known facts: * Hannaford became aware of the breach Feb. 27. * Investigators brought in to find the cause determined the data breach began on Dec. 7. * Hannaford didn't stop it until March 10.

Hannaford says the sensitive data was exposed when shoppers swiped their cards at checkout line machines and the information was transmitted to banks for approval. Hannaford doesn't store credit card information in its databases, but uses a wired network to transfer information, according to a Hannaford spokesperson.

There are many past cases where hackers broke into databases to capture card data. The Hannaford breach may be an attack on data in transit, says Gartner analyst Avivah Litan. "The PCI (Payment Card Industry) standards may need updating to say 'data in transit' - even on private networks - must be encrypted, or the network segment processing card data needs to be sufficiently segmented from the rest of the store's networks," Litan says.


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Question
?Given the latest data-breach news about Hannaford, what can an institution do to protect itself and its customers from further damaging incidents?
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"One-time passwords will require too much effort on the user's part to be effective. Here's a better idea: use smart cards rather than magnetic strips, and use a challenge-response authentication protocol.



Each card will contain a sealed cryptographic processor, with the account number stored inside it. When the card is swiped, it will send a "card ID", also stored on the card, to the bank. This is a random number 256 bits in length that is uniquely tied to the card but cannot be used directly for purchasing.



The bank's server will then look up the card ID and find the actual account number. It will then send a 256-bit random "salt" to the smart card. The card's processor then uses a cryptographic hash (probably SHA-256 or SHA-512) to mix the actual account number with the salt, and sends it to the bank.



The bank will then re-calculate the hash, using the account number tied to the card ID, and compare it to the hash received. If they match, the card is valid.





The card has thus been authorized, and the account number obtained by the bank, without transmission of confidential information over the wire. The only way that an attacker can obtain the card number X from a transaction, given the hash H and the salt S, is to mount a brute-force attack to by solving the equation F(S+X) = H.



One additional benefit of this technique is that even if the card reader is tampered with (for example, to log all transaction data) the data will still be secure. Since the salt changes every transaction, replay attacks are impossible.
"There is a simple answer to this systemic problem, One Time Password. Once VISA and MC require OTP for all transactions the game is over for the fraudsters. The technology exists, take a look at Verisigns VIP card - no I don't work for Verisign, there are plenty of vendors in the OTP space they are just an example.



VISA and MC must imbed this technology in their cards, demand that all issuers and merchants adopt and support it.



It would work like this: swipe card => enter pin => enter one time password. Now even if a fraudster gets the track data or breaches a database it won't matter unless they can crack the OTP, which is unlikely for the foreseeable near future and if they do we simply upgrade the OTP algorithms.
"Have VISA and MC impose an immediate surcharge of 25 cents per transaction that goes to the issuing banks for 2 years in addition to recovery costs of re-issued cards.