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Pay-At-The-Pump Skimming on the Rise

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Institutions, Customers Paying for Lack of Security on Gas Terminals
July 12, 2010 - Tracy Kitten, Managing Editor
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At a Shell station in Alachua, FL, last week, a service technician found a skimming device on a pay-at-the-pump terminal when he opened the machine for a routine maintenance check.

This incident, the latest in a wave of such attacks, highlights two concerns: That skimming isn't limited to ATMs, and that banking institutions and customers have yet another vulnerability to consider regarding payment card transactions.

Unlike ATM skimming devices, which are attached to the exterior of a machine, over the card reader, the Shell skimming device was actually inside the terminal, wired between the card scanner and the computer board.

Nicole Sturgill, research director at financial consultancy TowerGroup, says pay-at-the-pump terminals are more vulnerable to hidden skimming attacks because universal gas pump keys make them easy to access. In comparison, ATMs are required to have unique keys and codes for service and maintenance checks.

"Anyone who knows the key can get in," Sturgill says.

Little Control

When it comes to skimming attacks, financial institutions, as card-issuers, have little control.

"Once the terminal is outside the branch, there's not much the bank can do," says Mike Urban, senior director of global fraud solutions at FICO, which provides decision-management and predictive-analytics solutions for financial institutions.

When a card is compromised, however, the card issuer has to reimburse the customer. If incidents of skimming at unattended terminals such as pay-at-the-pump continue to rise, gaps in security may be looked at with more scrutiny.

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Universal keys, as an example, pose serious security risks, Urban says, and attacks on pay-at-the-pump terminals are escalating. Pointing to a case in Utah, where 180 pay-at-the-pump terminals were compromised with skimming devices and Bluetooth technology to transmit the card data, Urban illustrates the magnitude of the problem.

"It's certainly a concern and an issue that's been around for a while," he says. "They're easy to get in to. One would think that each specific gas station would have a key," but that's not the case.

Urban says compromises at pay-at-the-pump reflect a larger security concern: the explosion of self-service devices that now accept payments, with little focus paid to card data protection. "It's critical that we have standards that protect any kind of kiosk that takes payment information, like we have in place for the ATM."

Encryption, with PIN pads and standards that resemble what for years have been required of ATMs, is a first step, Urban says.

"Counterfeit card fraud is definitely growing," he says. "It's not going to go away."






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?Are you seeing increased incidents of non-ATM skimming?
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"Checking a pump daily isn't enough since the criminals can & will steal enough info within a 24 hour time period to make it worth their while. I'm curious whether pumps could be armed with some type of silent alarm to notify the station's personnel of a breach. Surveillance cameras perhaps would help??
"Actually, there is an easy way to foil skimmers -- using an external security device to generate a unique one-time code that must be entered with each transaction. These devices are used by many companies as part of their computer log-in procedure -- a somewhat simplified version could be used for credit card security -- perhaps with 3 or 4 digits rather than 6 to 8. The current devices are key fobs, in general. That or a credit card sized version would be user-friendly. The same device could be used with any credit card. If also accompanied with a demand for an answer to some question such as "What was your first pet's name?", the security for a credit card would be comparable to typical banking online systems.
"Yes, a growing problem. Skimmers coming from Europe and other places. The one key problem s not the only problem. Cooperative gas stations are also a problem. Short runs of skimming. Tamper-proof seals would not work. Gas stations are victims also;they dont manufacture the key pads and are restricted to the one key. There are other solutions, but the "Banking" industry wont step up to the plate and make more secure cards. Example: uble encryption of info on card, with user-required pw, instead of stupid zip code.
"Our skimming related to automated fuel dispensers is through the roof. These merchants need to be held accountable for their lack of security and share in the losses, especially as reductions in debit card interchange looms, and they may begin to receive additional benefit and cost reductions at our growing expenses. A single masterkey to potentially 1000s of pumps is absurd, and in some cases where I have spoken with the merchants, all that is needed is a wrench to get inside the pump. How difficult would it be to place tamper-proof seals around the access door and check daily??? What helped in our footprint is some of these stations getting bad press with their names in the paper as being the source of a compromise. They claim to be victims as well, so if that is the case: Step up to the plate and secure your pumps!!!