BankInfoSecurity.com - Information Security News, Regulations, & Education

Bank Information Security Articles

Hancock Breach Reveals New Trend

Fraudsters Swapping Out POS Devices, Stealing Card Data
April 19, 2010 - Linda McGlasson, Managing Editor
Share

Comment on this article

The Hancock Fabrics data breach continues to raise new questions about the security of point of sale (POS) devices at retail stores.

In March, the national fabric store chain publicly confirmed the breach it suffered last summer, sending an open letter to its customers, revealing: "PIN pad units at a limited number of Hancock Fabrics stores were stolen and replaced with visually identical, but fraudulent, PIN pad units. This may have allowed criminals to capture - or "skim" -- payment card data during transactions."

Hancock didn't reveal the locations or number of stores where point of sale scanners were compromised -- nor the number of customers who had their card data taken -- but at least 140 reports from customers in California, Wisconsin and Missouri show the pervasive nature of the fraud.

The lesson here: It is relatively easy for fraudsters to tamper with or even swap out POS PIN Entry Device (PED) pads, and these types of incidents are likely to increase, putting retailers, consumers and banking institutions at risk of future card-related fraud.

"These incidents are part of an ongoing trend where criminals are targeting non-PCI and PED-compliant point of sale terminals with devices installed to capture cardholder data," says Mike Urban, Sr. Director of Fraud Solutions at FICO.

How it Happens

Click to Get Updates on the Latest Information Security News

Typically, this crime begins when criminals target a single store, or -- as in the case of Hancock Fabrics -- multiple stores in various locations.

Urban describes how a gang of these criminals will go into a store. "They will feign illness to draw people away from a point of sale terminal in order to make the switch. It is a brazen act - almost to the point of opening the cash register - to swap out a POS terminal during business hours. In these cases, the criminals work together to create a cover of the terminal swapping activity."

While some would think that a store clerk or other employees wouldn't be duped so easily, PCI expert Dr. Anton Chuvakin notes that it isn't a huge social engineering feat to do a swap. "It's fairly easy in many cases," he says. "They'll come in, distract personnel and replace the equipment."

Even a more likely scenario would be that the criminals replace the pad when people just aren't around. "How many times have you gone into a retail store later in the evening and no one was at the checkout area?" he asks.

An unsettling trend in this type of crime is that some criminals have resorted to collusion with employees, or even used threats of violence to get the PEDs replaced, says PCI and security expert Branden Williams, Director of the Security Consulting Practice at RSA, the security division of EMC.

While the swapping of POS devices is easy to do, it is not as scalable as remote hacking. "A small amount of research can yield a short term gain by capturing a few cards, or even long term gains if the merchant is not uniquely keying each device," Williams says.

The types of devices being targeted for this are the older PIN pads, which are very simple devices. "They're much like a peripheral (mouse, keyboard, etc.) and this is the same effect as inserting a PS/2 or USB keystroke logger," says David Shackleford, a security expert at Sword & Shield, a computer and network security firm in Atlanta, GA. Shackleford says he would not be surprised to see more of these incidents "at merchants with weak physical security and store policies that were still using older technology."

Data at Risk

Once the device has been swapped, the amount of data to be stolen is related to the amount of time the compromised terminal is in place at the retail location. "It also depends on the number of cards that transact during that time. It can run into thousands of cards," says FICO's Urban.

In most of the POS terminal compromises Urban says he has seen in the U.S. that the data is stored on the POS terminal until the terminal is swapped back out. "But there is a trend where card compromising devices will broadcast data via Bluetooth or other wireless protocols," he says.

In the case of Hancock Fabrics, the type of pad used wasn't clear. "It's likely that the pads included a swipe reader and numeric keys, which means they could capture full track data and PINs, says Shackleford. "The false pads would have a fair amount of physical storage, and could likely hold a good number of debit and credit card numbers," he says.


1 | 2




Question
Question
?What have you done to warn business customers about PIN pad fraud?
Here's your chance to be a part of the dialogue and engage with your peers! Just enter your comment to the right, click submit to send it to our Editor. All entries are posted anonymously.
Please login if you would like to post a comment on this question.

"Anyone who is being honest regarding this incident would have to admit that PCI compliance would have done absolutely nothing to prevent or even detect this fraud. PCI compliance at these retail dial-up locations is a complete sham, and it is a farce to have "PCI experts" justify their "business" by commenting in this article. As one who works with merchants, this was more of a failure of the employees than the system in place. If the fraudlent PIN pads had more capabilities than the ones they replaced, there is no way the PIN pads would have looked the same. How do you not notice a bigger PIN pad divice when you go to check out a customer. Although I'll give you this, it's a great way to scare people into believing in PCI (that it actually does something for the merchants) so it helps the associations with their upcoming PCI deadlines.